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Abstract - In this paper, we have investigated the impact of the global financial crisis 
on the multi-horizon nature of systematic risk and market risk using daily data of eight 
major European equity markets over the period of 2005-2012. The method is based on 
a wavelet multiscale approach within the framework of a capital asset pricing model. 
The sample covers pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods with varying experiences 
and regimes. First we investigate for possible contagion effects of the U.S. crisis to the 
European stock markets and then we perform a local analysis of each European stock 
market separately. Empirical results demonstrate that beta coefficients have a 
multiscale tendency in sample countries and betas tend to increase at higher scale (lower 
frequencies) for the whole period. However, the size of betas and R2s tend to increase 
during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period.  The multiscale nature of the 
betas is consistent with the fact that stock market investors have different time horizons 
due to different trading strategies. Our results based on scale dependent value at risk 
(VaR) suggest that market risk tends to be more concentrated at lower time scale (higher 
frequencies) of the data. Moreover, the scale-by-scale estimates of VaR have increased 
almost three fold for every market during the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis 
period. Finally, we have presented an approach for accurately forecasting time-
dependent betas and VaR using wavelet networks. 
 
Key Words: global financial crisis, value at risk, multiscale systematic risk, CAPM, 
wavelet analysis, wavelet networks   
JEL Classification: C22; G15 
 
1. Introduction 
There is tremendous interest among financial analysts, researchers, policy makers 
and the general public regarding the impact of the recent United States subprime crisis 
on the global financial markets ensued by a prolonged and deep global recession.  The 
global financial crisis in 2008-2009 triggered by the subprime crisis led to a progressive 
deterioration of the investment situation and financial climate around the globe, in 
general, and European economies in particular.1 
Although the major financial US institutions, such as New Century Financial, US 
holding RI+6%&DQGWKHZRUOG¶VWRSILYHLQYHVWPHQWEDQNVVXIIHUHGKXJHORVVHVLQ
the subprime mortgage and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions by 
summer 2007, the world financial system observed a period of relative calm with some 
optimism regarding the outcome of the ongoing crisis until the eight months of 20082.  
Figure 1 presents a cursory example of several major banks¶ exposures to AIG during 
the time of financial crisis for readers to understand the magnitude and extent of the 
problem inherent in the systemic risks associated with the financial system and 
institutions. 
The subprime mortgage crisis eventually erupted when first, major US financial 
firms, such as Lehman Brothers and AIG, and then European financial institutions, such 
as Northern Rock, Fortis, Dexia, and a number of Icelandic banks, showed signs of 
insolvency.3  The crisis exposed the inherent vulnerabilities, systemic risks and a 
catalogue of regulatory failures in the global financial services industries.  The 
meltdown of the subprime crisis of 2007 exerted a meteor shower effect across the 
ZRUOG¶VVWRFNPDUNHWE\WKHIRXUWKTXDUWHURIWKH,QWKHODVWTXDUWHURIWKH
stock markets of both developed and emerging economies experienced large decline in 
prices of securities.4  Figure 2 presents movements of market indices of stock in four 





 Dowd (2009) noted that the size of the collaterized debt obligations (CDO) market in 2007 was around 
$500 billion, and then notional principal of the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) market by the end of 2007 
was around $60 trillion. 
3
 In a revised estimate of the International Monetary Fund, large US and European banks are expected 
to lose nearly 2.6 trillioQIURPWRZKHUHWKH86EDQNV¶IRUHFDVWHGORVVWHQGVWRUHDFKWULOOLRQ
and the European banks losses were expected to hit $1.6 trillion (see Choudhry and Jayasekera, 2012). 
4
 Batram and Bodnar (2009) noted that the global equity market which stood at an all-time high of $51 
trillion in October 2007, dropped to $22 trillion by the end of February 2009. 
countries, namely, United Kingdom, Germany, Greece and Spain, during the period of 
2005-2012 which uniformly demonstrates a sharp decline of share prices during the 
period of September-November, 2008 for all countries.  Although the stock markets of 
United Kingdom and Germany exhibit an upward trend after November 2008, the stock 
markets of Greece and Spain show a persistent downward trend in their share prices.  It 
is clearly evident that the Global financial crisis exerts an adverse impact on both 
systematic and market risks for all those countries. 
One fruitful way to assess the impact of the global financial crisis, and contagion is 
to proceed with an investigation of stock markets¶ responses in terms of their effects 
both on systematic and market risks in highly correlated markets linked with trade and 
investment.  Therefore, in this paper, we are investigating the impact of the global 
financial crisis on the stock markets of selected European markets, such as France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom within 
the framework of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  The stock exchanges of these 
countries represent major exchanges within the European Union (EU) in terms of both 
market capitalisation and trading volume5.  The behavior and performance of the 
CAPM during the pre-crisis, crisis, and two post-crisis periods provides a convenient 
and powerful framework for an empirical assessment of the impact of the crisis on the 
European stock markets. 
Eichengreen et. al. (2012) investigated the impact of subprime crisis on the 
global banking system using dynamic factor model.  The study employed principal 
FRPSRQHQWV DQDO\VLV WR LGHQWLI\ FRPPRQ IDFWRUV LQ WKH PRYHPHQW RI EDQNV¶ FUHGLW
default swap (CDS) spread.  The study found that the share of the variance accounted 
                                                 
5
 Furthermore, the US and European investors hold a large amount of financial assets in their portfolios 
by investing in ADR, GDR, country fund and direct participation in both markets.  Given this closer 
relationship, investors and financial institutions from a number of European countries suffered huge 
losses in the US real estate market. 
by common factors rose steadily to exceptional level from the outbreak of the subprime 
crisis which reflected the heightened funding and counterparty risks coupled with the 
GHWHULRUDWLRQRIEDQNV¶ORDQSRUWIROio.  Vo (2014) utilized coexceedance approach to 
examine financial contagion in Euro Area and South Asian markets using a framework 
of multinomial logit regression model and daily data spanning the period January 2007 
to March 2013.  Exceedances are defined as extreme negative returns that are below a 
certain threshold (i.e., 5% bottom tail) in one country, whereas coexceedances refer to 
the joint occurrences of exceedances in two or more markets.  The study documented 
evidence of coexceedances during global financial crisis and Eurozone crisis.  
Choudhry and Jayasekera (2013) reported that during the turbulent period of global 
financial crisis, betas increased for most firms in the UK from the pre-crisis to the crisis 
period and the level of market efficiency declined significantly from the pre-crisis to 
crisis period.  Given the anecdotal evidence of significant deterioration of systematic 
risk and market risk, the findings from these studies indicate that the extent of co-
movement in stock markets points to tendencies of the degree to which the global 
financial system is perceived to be tied to common factors.  Consequently, CAPM and 
International Capital Pricing Model (ICAPM) provide an appropriate methodological 
framework to approximate the heightened systematic risk underlying the deterioration 
of common factor in such turbulent market condition. 
In this paper, we have employed a recent and powerful method to estimate the 
systematic risk of CAPM using wavelet analysis (WA) to examine the meteor shower 
effects of the global financial crisis.  One recent research strand of CAPM has built an 
empirical modeling strategy centering on the issue of the multiscale nature of the 
systematic risk using a framework of WA (Fernandez 2006, Gencay et al. 2005, Masih 
et al. 2010, and Norsworthy et al.2000).  The wavelet analysis provides a powerful tool 
to decompose time-series data into orthogonal components with different frequencies 
and the method can accommodate structural change, discontinuity and regime shifts.  
The multi-horizon nature of the systematic risk or beta encompasses a range of ongoing 
research issues, such as time-varying beta, instability of beta, and varying behavior of 
beta with respect to return interval.  Therefore, we have employed a wavelet approach 
to estimate and analyze the systematic risk and market risk on a scale-by-scale basis.  
The rationale and motivation for the use of a wavelet approach is discussed in the 
following sections.  In our analysis we first investigate for possible contagion effects 
of the U.S. crisis to the European stock markets and then we perform a local analysis 
of each European stock market separately by applying a national CAPM. Our results 
suggest that the beta coefficients have a multi scale dependency and tend to increase at 
higher scale making CAPM predictions more meaningful for investment horizons of 8-
16 days.  In addition, the market risk tends to be concentrated at lower time scales.  
Finally, we have applied a new class of artificial neural networks, namely Wavelet 
Networks (WNs), in order to study if the dynamics and the multiscale nature of the 
systematic risks can be captured and forecasted.  Our results indicate that WNs 
constitute an accurate tool for forecasting the multisacle nature of the systematic risk.  
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief literature review 
surrounding the research strand of the stock market linkage and propagation, global 
financial crisis and the multiscale nature of systematic risks.  Section 3 presents the 
model and furnishes a discussion on the methodology.  Section 4 provides data 
description.  Sections 5 and 6 discuss empirical results.  In section 7 WNs are used to 
forecast the betas and the 2R .  More precisely in section 7.1 a quick introduction to 
WNs is presented while in section 7.2 our empirical results are presented and discussed.  
Finally, in section 8 we conclude. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical Underpinning and Implication 
The notion and significance of equity market linkage, crisis, contagion and 
spillovers spawned considerable research both at a theoretical and an empirical level 
that spans over almost three decades following financial market liberalisation, 
globalisation and the development of communication and information technology.6  
One of the principal conduits for stock market propagation is that as world equity 
markets are becoming more integrated, so individual stock prices share common 
stochastic trend(s), alternatively known as cointegration.  The long-run co-trending 
properties of stock indices across markets indicate that stock prices in these markets are 
underpinned by the same economic growth factors that determine earnings and 
dividends.  The application of International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) 
yields theoretical predictions which are in accordance with common trend(s).  The 
latent factor model and the recent dynamic factor model hypothesise that stock prices 
are driven by three factors: a world factor; a regional factor; and a local factor 
representing idiosyncratic risk.  A special case of cointegration is contagion where 
markets become excessively coupled.  Bekeart et. al. (2005) defined contagion as 
correlation which exceeds the correlation that is produced by market fundamentals.  
They distinguish between two factors underlying a stock return: the US equity market 
return and the regional equity market return.  Within this framework, the magnitude 
                                                 
6
 Early research has explored stock market interdependence in terms of the dynamics of the conditional 
first moment (mean) of the distribution of returns.  For example, see, Becker et. al. (1990), Choudhry et. 
al. (2007) and a list of references therein, and Masih and Masih (2002) and a list of references therein.  
A second research strand has also focused on the dynamics of stock market interdependence but in terms 
RI µERWK¶ FRQGLWLRQDO ILUVW PRPHQW DQG VHFRQG PRPHQW RI WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ RI UHWXUQV LH PHDQ DQG 
volatility spillovers across markets.  For example, see Engle et. al. (1990), Engle et. al. (2012) and a list 
of references therein, and Theodossiou and Lee (1993). A third research strand has been concerned with 
the issues of crisis and contagion.  For example, see Classens and Forbes (2001), Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002), Dungey and Martin (2007), Dungey and Tambakis (2005), and Engle et. al. (2012) and a list of 
references therein. 
and structure of correlations are examined, consequent upon a change in the volatility 
factor and factor sensitivities. 
Engle et. al. (1990) proposed two hypotheses as to how volatility might manifest 
itself across trading centers7KHµKHDWZDYH¶K\SRWKHVLVDVVHUWVWKDWYRODWLOLW\KDVRQO\
location-specific autocorrelation, such that a volatile day in New York, for example, 
ZRXOG EH IROORZHG E\ DQRWKHU YRODWLOH GD\ LQ 1HZ <RUN  7KH µPHWHRU VKRZHU¶
hypothesis asserts that intraday volatility extends from one trading center to another, so 
that a volatile day in New York, for example, would be followed by a volatile day in 
London.  Engle et al. describe the meteor showers in the context of complete access to 
world-wide news in a market which allows for continuous trading.  In this model, 
terrestrial geography plays no role in determining the impact of news on the volatility 
of financial markets.  In such a market, volatility spillovers occur when uninformed 
liquidity traders and investors with heterogeneous priors cannot efficiently absorb 
private information in the price formation of securities. 
Given the theoretical underpinning and implications for efficiency, understanding 
the behavior of stock market propagation is important for several reasons.  First, 
comprehending the behavior of stock market propagation is important to the investors 
and financial practitioners for valuing securities, executing hedging strategies and 
taking asset allocation decisions.  Second, information on stock market propagation and 
volatility is needed by regulators of financial industries for the calculation of Minimum 
Capital Risk Requirement (MCRR), stress test and scenario analysis, based on value at 
risk and/or extreme value models.  The information is of particular relevance for policy-
makers with scope for intervention in financial markets and regulation of equity 
markets. 
2.2 Empirical Studies on Global Financial Crisis 
In the case of the recent global financial crisis, the problem is considered to have 
emanated from the toxic securitized markets, with consequent spillovers to the 
derivative markets, via, for example, Credit Default Swap (CDS), and to equity 
markets, by virtue of the meteor showers on the global financial markets.  
Consequently, a large body of empirical literature has accumulated in recent years 
regarding the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis on the global 
financial markets.7  The literature review which follows here constitutes merely a few 
representative sample of research that has been focused on the financial markets 
regarding the causes and consequences of the global financial crisis. 
Dorn (2009) contended that U.S. housing policy, along with securitization and easy 
money contributed to the asset price bubble in the housing market.8  The role of 
government-sponsored enterprises, flawed financial-risk models, lax regulatory 
framework, inadequate credit rating and innovations that allowed banks to 
overleverage-all these factors in a body contributed to the sub-prime crisis.  Schwartz 
(2009) argued that the process of asset securitization produced products that were 
difficult to price.  Calomiris (2009) argued that inadequate or inappropriate regulation 
contributed to the subprime crisis by allowing banks to maintain insufficient amounts 
of equity capital per unit of risk undertaken in their subprime holdings. 
Eichengreen et. al. (2012) investigated the impact of subprime crisis on the global 
EDQNLQJV\VWHPE\H[DPLQLQJWKHPRYHPHQWRIEDQNV¶FUHGLWGHIDXOWVZDSVSUHDG7KH
study reported that share of the variance accounted by common factors was at 62% prior 
to the outbreak of the subprime crisis.  During the period of July 2007 to September 
                                                 
7
 Interested readers are referred to samples of few articles from special issues of the following journals 
on this topic: Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 20, Issue 1-2, 2010, Cato Journal, Vol 29, Issue 1, 
Winter 2009, Journal of International Money and Finance (in press). 
8
 Calomiris (2009) noted that total subprime and Alt-A originations grew from $395 billion in 2003 to 
$715 in 2004 and increased to $1,005 billion in 2008. 
2008, the share of common factor rose to 77%.  Banti et. al. (2012) using proprietary 
data from a large investment bank reported that the magnitude of liquidity risk premium 
increased substantially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers during the period of 
financial crisis.  Vo (2014) found evidence of coexceedances during global financial 
crisis and Eurozone crisis periods.  The study reported that changes in exchange rates, 
the volatility of regional stock markets, the change in US long term interest rates, the 
TED spread and VIX are strongly significant to explain the probability of the joint 
occurrences of heavy losses in the Euro Area.  Vardar and Aydogan (2014) examined 
the existence of dynamic linkages among the major emerging stock markets, namely 
Brazil, Hungary, China, Taiwan, Poland and Turkey, as well as developed markets, 
such as the US, the UK and Germany during the period 2004-2013 by splitting the 
sample in two sub-periods: before crisis and after crisis.  Their empirical findings 
indicate that the direction of the long-run relationship varies across sub-periods; during 
the crisis and post crisis periods, the stock market interdependence increased.  They 
also reported evidence of herding behavior of investors during the period of stock 
market crash.9 
In recent studies Choudhry and Jayasekera (2012, 2013) investigated the 
anomalous behavior of stock prices and asymmetric response of time-varying beta 
using the data from US-UK bank stocks and UK stock markets during the period of 
global financial crisis, respectively.  Their empirical results reported that the level of 
market efficiency declined and the time-varying betas for individual firms increased 
significantly during the crisis period.  They rationalized the anomalous behavior of 
stock prices in terms of two competing hypotheses, i.e., market efficiency hypothesis 
                                                 
9
 Given the evidence of increasing dynamic co-movements of stock markets during the periods of crisis 
and post crisis, Vardar and Aydogan (2014) suggested that opportunities of the international risk 
diversification and achievement of greater portfolio returns had been reduced for the international 
investors. 
and behavioral finance based explanation.  The market efficiency hypothesis (EMH) 
predicts that beta of individual stock rises (fall) in response to abnormally negative 
(positive) returns as an asymmetric response to good and bad news.  Regarding the 
behavioral finance explanation, there exists plethora of literature which presents 
evidence of over/under reaction of stock prices to new information.10  In a separate 
study Choudhry and Jayesekara (2014) investigated the asymmetric effect of news on 
the time-varying beta on selected thirteen banks from seven European countries using 
the daily data spanning the period 2002 to 2013.  Their empirical evidence again 
documented evidence of declining market efficiency, increased size of time-varying 
beta and asymmetric effect in time-varying beta during the period of financial crisis.  
Although their results demonstrate some evidence of market efficiency through non-
market shock, European banks have shown evidence of significant amount of 
uncertainty leading to asset mispricing through market shocks. 
There is a rich array of literature on the asymmetric effect of good and bad news 
on stock prices.  For example, see Black (1976), Christe 1982), Cho and Engle (1999), 
and Glosten et. al. (1993); see Choudhry and Jayesekera (2012, 2013, 2014) for a list 
of reference.  The explanation of asymmetric effect on time-varying beta emanates from 
two plausible sources, such as leverage based explanation and volatility based 
explanation.  The leverage effect is due to the reduction in the equity value, which 
would raise the debt-equity ratio, hence raising the riskiness of the firm as a result of 
an increase in future volatility.11  The volatility based explanation posits a positive 
relation between volatility and expected risk premium.12  An increase in volatility raises 
                                                 
10
 For example, see Loughran and Ritter (1995), Dharan and Ikenberry (1995), Frazzini (2006); and for 
a list of reference see Choudhry and Jaysekera (2014). 
11
 For example, see Black (1976), Cho and Engle (1999), Christe (1982), and Glosten et al. (1993). 
12
 For example, see Poterba and Summers (1986), Bollerslev et. al. (1988), and Choudhry and Jayasekera 
(2013) and a list of reference therein. 
the expected return by lowering the stock prices which in turn contributes to the 
asymmetric effect in volatility.  Consequently, this effect in volatility is impacted upon 
the beta through an asymmetric effect.  In a recent study Iqbal and Kume (2014) 
investigated the impact of the recent financial crisis on the capital structure decision of 
UK, French and German firms.  Their results indicate that overall leverage ratios 
increased from pre-crisis (2006 and 2007) to crisis (2008 and 2009) period and then 
decreased in the post-crisis (2010 and 2011) period. 
2.3 Empirical Studies on CAPM 
Since the seminal contribution made by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), the 
notion and significance of the CAPM has spawned considerable research at both 
theoretical and empirical levels that spans almost six decades.  According to CAPM, in 
a perfect capital market, the excess return of a stock or a portfolio of stocks (return over 
the riskless rate of return) should move in proportion to the market premium (market 
UHWXUQRYHUWKHULVNOHVVUDWHRIUHWXUQ7KHSURSRUWLRQDOLW\IDFWRUNQRZQDVµEHWD¶ E ) 
FDSWXUHVWKHµV\VWHPDWLFULVN¶RIWKHPDUNHW$OWKRXJKHarly research during the 1970s 
was supportive of the theoretical prediction of the CAPM, later studies during the 1980s 
and 1990s yielded mixed results.  Empirical research aimed at testing the validity of the 
CAPM progressed and expanded through several distinct strands.  *HQoD\ et al. (2005) 
succinctly summarized those issues as: the stability of beta over time, borrowing 
constraints, the impact of structural change and regime switches, the effect of world 
markets and volatility, non-synchronous data issues, time horizons of investors and the 
impact of return interval. 
Previous studies suggest that the empirical validity of CAPM appears to depend on 
the return interval chosen albeit with mixed results.  For example, studies of Kothari et 
al. (1995), and Handa et al. (1993) show that sE  from annual returns produce stronger 
relation between beta and average return than sE  from monthly return.  Frankfurter et 
al. (1994) contend that the mean and variance of E  increases from daily returns to 
yearly returns.  A study by Brailsford and Faff (1997) suggests that CAPM is rejected 
when daily returns data is used, while CAPM is accepted when weekly returns data is 
used.  In contrast, Fama and French (1996) show that annual and monthly ȕs produce 
the same inference about the ȕ premium.13 
Given the mixed results regarding the inference about the CAPM and ȕs, and the 
multiscale nature of the systematic risk, in this paper, we have employed a powerful 
method to estimate the systematic risk of CAPM using WA to examine the meteor 
shower effects of the global financial crisis on selected European stock markets.  WA 
provides an appropriate platform to investigate the multi-scale behavior of beta at 
different time horizons in a frequency domain framework.  More precisely, we first 
investigate for contagion effects from the U.S. crisis to the European stock markets and 
then we apply locally the multiscale CAPM framework using WA. 
Our analysis is also motivated by Fernandez (2006), Gencay et al. (2005), Masih 
et al. (2010), and Norsworthy et al. (2000), among others, who advocate the 
incorporation of different time scales using a framework of WA in the empirical 
reassessment of CAPM.  As Masih et al. (2010) contended, the security market consists 
of thousands of traders and investors with different time horizons and strategies in their 
mind regarding the investment decision.14  Owing to different decision-making time 
                                                 
13
 Several explanations are offered for the interval bias of systematic risk, such as infrequent trading, 
delays in information processing, increase of standard error of the beta as the return interval is 
lengthened, disproportionate move of covariance relative to the variance estimate in the measurement of 
beta, and seasonality.  Masih et al. (2010) furnished a good discussion on the issue. 
14
 For example, within the speculator group, there are scalpers, day traders and position trader who act 
in the markets ranging from minute by minute, hour by hour, day by day, even month by month.  Even 
within the three different types of participants, i.e., hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs, in the derivative 
markets, there are long-horizon traders who concentrate on long-run price fundamental and there are 
short-term traders who respond to information within a short-term horizon [see, Conner and Rossiter 
(2005), and Fernandez (2008)]. 
 
horizons and strategies, among investors, the true dynamics of the relationship between 
stock returns and risk factors is likely to vary depending on the time horizon of the 
investors.  In addition, even if investors agree on a well-diversified portfolio to be the 
proxy of market portfolio, their perception and measurement of the portfolio risk will 
not be the same.  In this circumstance, financial analysts need to examine the behavior 
of systematic risk using a framework of different time scales or horizons in decision 
making process.  Furthermore, Fernandez (2006) recommends the use of wavelet 
method as a suitable alternative to GARCH and GARCH-in-mean models to study the 
time-varying beta and time-varying risk premium.  Wavelet analysis provides a robust 
approach under the conditions of structural break, discontinuity, non-normality and 
time-varying volatility. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The choice of optimal portfolio in investment decision emanates from the 
consumption-saving-investment decision of a representative investor.  The choice of 
the optimal portfolio is a function of both the risk-return possibility curve that is 
available in the market and the investor's utility function.  The optimum consumption-
saving-investment decision is obtained by setting the investor's subjective marginal rate 
of substitution (MRS) between risk and return equal to the slope of the risk-return 
possibility curve. 
Both life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses utilize an inter-temporal 
optimization framework where our infinitely-lived representative household is faced 
with the following problem of maximization15: 
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 This part draws extensively from Gencay et al. (2005) and Gausden and Whitfield (2000). 
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 11 ,    , 1,...,t s t t s sE w E r w y c s t t      fª º¬ ¼  (2) 
where tE denotes mathematical expectations, conditional on all information available 
at t; į signifies rate of subjective time preference; ( )u  implies single-period utility 
function; variables c, w, r and y denote constant-price consumer expenditure, real value 
of non-human wealth, real rate of interest, and real labor income, respectively. 
Solving the first-order condition for a constrained optimization problem from the 
corresponding lagrangean function, and after certain manipulation, we may derive the 
following stochastic Euler equation (see Gausden and Whitfield, 2000): 
   
)())1/()1(( 1 tttt cuErcuE c c  G     (3) 
 
Equation (3) asserts that optimal consumption decision requires marginal utilities of 
adjacent periods to be proportional to one another.  Assuming that consumer can 
allocate his wealth among n-1 risky assets with a 
,i tr rate of return and a riskless asset 
with a rate of return 
,f tr , the resulting first order condition may be rewritten as: 
    1 , , 1 ,, 0t i t f t t i tE u c E r r Cov u c r c cª º ª º   ª º¬ ¼ ¬ ¼¬ ¼  (4) 
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 (5) 
If we further assume that the return of a benchmark market portfolio (provided by 
market index) is inversely related with the marginal utility of consumption in the next 
period, so that: 
  1 ,t m tu c rJc    (6) 
for some positive Ȗ. 
It follows that  1 , , ,, ,t i t i t m tCov u c r Cov r rJcª º ª º ¬ ¼ ¬ ¼ and allows us to rewrite equation 
(5) after certain manipulation as16: 
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Equation (7) in estimable form yields the widely presented testing equation for the 
CAPM (Sharpe 1964, Linter 1965): 
  
, , , , ,i t f t m t f t i tr r r rE H     (8) 
The CAPM predicts that the return to individual stock is a direct and linear function 
RIWKHLQYHVWPHQWV¶V\VWHPDWLFULVNEquation (8) is estimated at different time-scales.  
The beta is defined as: 










E       (9) 
Where ),(
,, tmti rrCov signifies the covariance between the return on asset i and the return 
on the market portfolio and )(
,tmrVar  denotes the variance of the portfolio return.  When 
beta is found to be more than unity, this suggests that the firm under study is perceived 
more risky than the market.  Alternatively, if beta is greater than 1, the security is termed 
to be aggressive, and if it is less than 1, it is said to be defensive. 
3.2 Wavelet Analysis 
WA is an extension of Fourier analysis.  The fundamental idea behind wavelets is 
to analyze according to scale.  Low scale represents high frequency while high scales 
represent low frequency.  The wavelet transform (WT) not only is localized in both 
time and frequency but also overcomes the fixed time-frequency partitioning.  This 
means that the WT has good frequency resolution for low-frequency events and good 
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 For a detailed derivation, see Gencay et al. (2005). 
time resolution for high-frequency events.  Hence, the WT can be used to analyze time 
series that contain no stationary dynamics at many different frequencies.  Wavelet 
techniques are being used in finance, for detecting the properties of quick variation of 
values and it is a powerful tool for representing nonlinearities (Alexandridis and 
Zapranis 2014).17 
The daily return time-series are represented by local information such as frequency, 
duration, intensity and time-position and by global information such as the mean states 
over different time periods.  Both global and local information is needed for a correct 
analysis of the daily return time-series.  Wavelets have the ability to decompose a signal 
or a time-series in different levels bringing out the structure of the underlying signal as 
well as trends, periodicities, singularities or jumps that cannot be observed originally. 
As illustrated in Donoho and Johnstone (1994) the wavelet approach is very flexible 
in handling very irregular data series.  Ramsey (1999) contends that WA has the ability 
to represent highly complex structures without knowing the underlying functional form, 
which is of great benefit in economic and financial research. 
3.3 Maximal Overlap Discrete Wavelet Transform 
Two versions of the WT can be distinguished.  The continuous wavelet transforms 
(CWT) and the discrete wavelet transforms (DWT).  The CWT can operate at every 
scale. However, an upper bound is determined since CWT is extremely computationally 
expensive.  In order to reduce the computational burden, alternatively wavelet 
coefficients are calculated only on a subset of scale under the DWT method.  In this 
study we use the Maximal Overlap DWT (MODWT).  The MODWT is an extension 
of the classical DWT that has many desirable properties (Gencay et al. 2002, Percival 
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 Fernandez (2006), Gencay et al.(2002, 2005), In and Kim (2006, 2007), Kim and In (2005, 2007), 
Maharaj et al. (2011), Masih et al. (2010), Norsworthy et al. (2000), Ramsey (1999), Rua and Nunes 
(2012) and Zapranis and Alexandridis (2008) are sample of recent few papers which have used wavelet 
approach to analyse financial time series. 
and Walden 2000, and In and Kim 2007)18.  First, the MODWT can handle any sample 
size of the data.  Second, the MODWT does not suffer from sensitivity to the choice of 
a starting point for a time series.  More precisely, in MODWT both wavelet and scaling 
coefficients are invariant to circularly shifting the original time series.  Third, the detail 
and smooth coefficients of a MODWT multi-resolution analysis (MRA) are associated 
with zero phase filters.  Hence, it is possible to align features in the MRA with the 
original time-series.  Finally, the wavelet variance estimator is asymptotically more 
efficient than the same estimator based on the DWT.  However, on the other hand the 
MODWT is more computationally expensive than the classical DWT19. 
A time-series ( )f t  can be written as a linear combination of wavelet functions as 
follows: 
 
, , , , 1, 1, 1, 1,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )J k J k J k J k J k J k k k
k k k k
f t s t d t d t d tM \ \ \ |    ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦  (10) 
where J  is the number of scales and k indicates the thk  coefficient.  Following the 
notations from Fernandez (2006) the wavelet transformed coefficients 
,J ks , ,J kd « 1,kd  
can be approximated by the following integrals:    
, ,J k J ks t f t dtM| ³  and 
   
, ,J k J kd t f t dt\| ³  where 1,2,...,j J .  The functions ,j kM  and ,j k\  are the 
                                                 
18So far, the MODWT was successfully applied in many studies in finance.  For example, the MODWT 
was applied for the estimation of the hedge ratio in In and Kim (2006), while it was used in the estimation 
of the International CAPM in In and Kim (2007).  The estimation of the systematic risk was studied in 
*HQoD\et al. (2002, 2005), Masih et al. (2010) and Rabeh and Mohamed (2011).  In Maharaj et al. 
(2011), a comparison is made of developed and emerging equity market return volatility at different time 
scales.  In Kim and In (2007), the relationship between changes in stock prices and bond yields in the G7 
countries was studied.  Finally, in Kim and In (2005) the relationship between stock returns and inflation 
is examined using the MODWT. 
19In this study the LA8 (Least Asymmetric of length 8) wavelet transform filter is used.  Our analysis is 
performed in 5 levels of the decomposition and the reflection method was used for the boundary 
conditions. 
 
approximating wavelet functions.  By setting 
, ,
( ) ( ) ( )J J k J k
k
S t s t tM ¦  and 
, ,
( ) ( ) ( )J J k J k
k
D t d t t\ ¦  the original time-series can be reconstructed: 
 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )J J Jf t S t D t D t D t|      (17) 
This reconstruction is known as MRA.  MRA is applied in order to reconstruct the 
original time-series from the wavelet and scaling coefficients.  The elements of JS are 
related to the scaling coefficients at the maximal scale and therefore represent the 
smooth components of ( )f t .  The elements of jD  are the detail (or rough) coefficients 
of ( )f t  at scale j . 
3.4 Computation of Wavelet Variance and Covariance 
In order to estimate the wavelet-variance, the variance must be split into various 
parts, each one representing the variance at each scale.  This wavelet-variance analysis 
shows us which scales are contributing significantly to the overall variability of the 
time-series (Percival and Walden, 2000).  For a stationary process X , the variance 2XV  
is given by: 






 ¦  (18) 
where  2x jX W  is the wavelet variance for scale jW .  Equation (18) is analogous to the 
relationship between the variance of a stationary process and its spectral density 
function (see for example, Fernandez, 2006; and Masih et al.2010).  An unbiased 
estimator of the wavelet variance is given by (Gencay et al. 2002):  












 ¦  (20) 
where 2
,j td  is the MODWT wavelet coefficients at scale jW , n  is the sample size, jL  is 
the length of the scale jW  wavelet filter and jN is the number of the MODWT 
coefficients unaffected by the boundary. 
Similarly, an unbiased estimator of the wavelet-covariance between two time-
series X  and Y  is given by: 
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Since the wavelet variance and wavelet covariance are known, under the CAPM 
the wavelet beta estimator for asset i  at scale j  is defined as: 
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where  2Ö
i mR R jX W  is the wavelet covariance of asset i  and the market portfolio at scale 
j , and  2Ö
mR jX W  is the wavelet variance of the market portfolio at  scale j .  
Furthermore, the wavelet 2R  estimator for asset i  at scale j  is given by: 
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4. Data description 
We are investigating the impact of the crisis on the stock markets of eight European 
markets.  The selected markets are distinguished in two groups.  The first group consists 
of four countries that at the moment face much European uncertainty and are under a 
rescue program and under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and/or the European Central Bank (ECB).  These countries are: Portugal, Italy, Greece 
and Spain.  On the other hand, the second group consists of four countries whose 
economies are traditionally considered strong and stable.  These countries are: 
Germany, Netherlands, UK and France.  The selected countries represent major 
exchanges within the EU in terms of both market capitalization and trading volume.20 
Our data set includes the daily values of the main stock index in each country from 
June 1, 2005 to September 10, 2012 as well as the daily stock prices of the stocks that 
constitute each index21. 
In this study we estimate the beta of a risky asset at different time-frequencies and 
in different time-periods in order to obtain an estimate of the impact of the U.S. crisis 
in the systematic risk in these markets.  
Our data set is split into four different periods.  The first data set corresponds to 
the pre-crisis period and includes daily stock values from June 1, 2005 to July 31, 2007.  
The second data set represents the crisis period and it is the dataset ranges from August 
1, 2007 to September 30, 200922.  The third data set represents the post-crisis period in 
U.S. and the beginning of the crisis in Europe, October 1, 2009 to November 30, 2011.  
Finally, there is a fourth data set from December 1, 2011 to September 10, 2012 that 
represents the current situation in Europe. 
In order to avoid survivorship bias only the stocks that survive for each sample 
period are examined.23  Daily return series for each stock as well as the market index 
were collected from each stock market.  This resulted in 564 values for the first sample, 
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 The value of stock market capitalization for markets of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece in 2012 are 3019, 1823, 1486, 651, 995, 480, 66 and 45 
billion US dollars, respectively. 
21
 The eight indices are the following: AEX25 from Netherlands, FTSE/ATHEX 20 from Greece, CAC 
40 from France, DAX 30 from Germany, FTSE 100 from UK, IBEX 35 from Spain, MIB 40 from Italy 
and PSI 20 from Portugal. 
22The mortgage financial crisis usually starts from the August 1, 2007 and continues until July 31, 2009. 
23
 Pre-crisis: Netherlands: 23, Greece: 19, France: 37, Germany: 30, UK: 87, Spain: 26, Italy: 32, 
Portugal: 15. 
In-crisis: Netherlands: 23, Greece: 20, France: 40, Germany: 30, UK: 94, Spain: 30, Italy: 36, Portugal: 
17.  
First post-crisis: Netherlands: 23, Greece: 20, France: 40, Germany: 30, UK: 97, Spain: 31, Italy: 39, 
Portugal: 18. 
Second post-crisis: Netherlands: 25, Greece: 20, France: 40, Germany: 30, UK: 100, Spain: 35, Italy: 
40, Portugal: 19. 
566 for the second, 565 for the third, 203 for the fourth, giving a total of 1898 values. 
The logarithmic returns of the stocks, 
,i tr , and of the market index, ,m tr , were computed. 
For the estimation of model (8) the risk-free rate of return is proxied by the daily 
rate of return from 1-month Euribor offer rate for all countries with an exception in the 
case of the U.K. where it is represented by the daily rate of return from the 1-month UK 
Treasury bill rate. 
5. Empirical results 
In this section the contagion effects of the U.S. crisis on eight European stock 
markets will be studied.  Then, our analysis will be focused locally in each country by 
studying the multiscale systematic risk. 
In Table 1 the correlation between the S&P 500 and the selected European stock 
markets under study is presented.  The correlation was estimated in different time-
periods.  During the pre-crisis period the correlation coefficients between the U.S. and 
European markets range around 0.96 for all countries.  Focusing on the in-crisis time 
period, we observe a slight increase in the correlation, as it is expected.  In the first post-
crisis period where the U.S. economy started to recover while in the Eurozone the first 
stages of the crisis, it is evident that the correlation significantly decreased. The 
correlation between the market index of the weak economies and the S&P 500 is 
negative (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal), while it is 0.83 and 0.87 for Germany and 
UK respectively.  Finally, focusing on the second U.S. post-crisis period when the crisis 
in Europe was deeper, we observe an increase in the correlation with an exception of 
Spain and Portugal where the correlation remains negative. 
As it can be seen, correlation coefficients show significant instability over the sub-
periods.  The same correlation rises during the crisis period, and then decreases with 
change in sign and magnitude for four countries during the first post-crisis period.  
Therefore, it is evident that the U.S. crisis had an effect on the performance of the major 
European stock markets.  Next, we will focus on the local CAPM of each country. 
In Table 2 to Table 5 the beta and 2R  at each scale j are presented while in the last 
two columns the beta and 2R from the raw data are presented.  In each scale the average 
beta and the average 2R of all stocks of each index are presented.  The raw values refer 
to the classic CAPM estimation using regression.  The raw values of beta and R2 were 
estimated for comparison reasons.  In all tables the raw values are very close to the 
average beta and R2 across all scales.  Our analysis was performed in a depth of 5 scales.  
Scale 1 corresponds to periods of 2-4 days, scale 2 to 4-8 days, scale 3 to 8-16 days, 
scale 4 to 16-32 days and scale 5 to 32-64 days. 
In Table 2 the results for the pre-crisis period are presented.  It is clear that the linear 
relationship between an individual stock and the market portfolio becomes stronger as 
the scale increases.  However, in most cases a slight decrease is observed at scale 5.  In 
other words the maximum values of beta and 2R  are observed in scales 3 and 4.  Our 
results accord well with Gencay et al. (2005) and Fernandez (2006).  The results for all 
countries are similar. The mean betas in each scale are close to 1 and increase in higher 
scales. We also observe that the systematic risk of almost all stocks and proposed 
portfolio is less than one in the markets of Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and 
Portugal for 2-64 days horizon.  This suggests that the benchmark market indices have 
a reduced impact on assets in these markets in the short- to intermediate-run horizons.  
Similarly, the 2R increases as the scale increases.  The 2R  ranges from 0.12 at scale 2 
for Portugal to 0.50 at scale 5 for Spain.  The lower values of 2R  are observed in 
Portugal, Netherlands and Greece while the highest values are observed in Spain, 
Germany and France.  In addition, we also observe that countries with greatest 
sensitivities to the market portfolio in the raw data are Spain and UK, followed by 
France. 
Our analysis in Table 3 reflects the results during the in-crisis period.  Closer 
inspection of Table 3 reveals that betas have increased for the stock markets of France, 
Netherlands and Portugal.  The increased magnitudes of betas reflect heightened 
sensitivity of financial market to the whole range of economic and financial variables, 
and incomplete knowledge regarding the magnitudes to toxic asset positions in the early 
stage of the crisis.  The evidence of increased betas during the financial crisis era is 
consistent with the findings of Choudhry and Jayesekara (2012, 2013, 2014) and 
others.24  During the crisis, negative information led to a freeze in several markets 
which may have led to decrease in magnitudes of betas in other markets, i.e., the 
markets for Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK.  However, the R2 is increased for every 
country.  The lower values of 2R  observed in UK, Germany, Italy, and Portugal are 
0.35, 0.35, 0.37 and 0.38, respectively while the 2R  for the remaining countries is over 
0.40 and up to 0.53 for Spain.  In addition, in contrast to the remaining countries, the 
beta for Greece fluctuates between 0.83 and 0.84 for the first four scales and then 
increases to 0.92 in the last scale.  For the remaining countries the maximum beta is 
observed at scales 3 and 4 while the minimum, usually, at scale 1. 
Next, we focus on Table 4 where the results during the first post-crisis period are 
presented.  This period reflects the end of the US crisis and the beginning of the 
European crisis.  Our results indicate that the betas in almost every country are almost 
1 for each scale although a slight increase is observed at higher scales.  The increased 
sizes of the betas again indicate the heightened sensitivities induced by the uncertainty 
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 Rua and Nunes (2012) noted that beta tends to rise during crises period, such as the Mexican crisis in 
1994, Emerging market crisis in 1998, Turkish crisis in 2006 and recent global financial crisis. 
 
of the Eurozone crisis in these markets.  The 2R  has increased in each country and it 
is 0.51, 0.48, 0.61, 0.51, 0.44, 0.57, 0.53, 0.47 in Netherlands, Greece, France, 
Germany, UK, Spain, Italy and Portugal, respectively for the raw data.  Again the 
maximum betas are observed at scales 3 and 4 while the minimum at scale 1 for most 
countries.  For all countries the 2R  increases from scale 1 to scale 3 and then starts to 
decrease until scale 5. 
Table 5 presents the results of our analysis in the last time-period which reflects 
the current situation in Europe.  The results are similar to the ones presented in Table 
4. However, an increase is observed in the beta values of Netherlands, Greece, France, 
and Italy. On the other hand, the betas in Germany and UK remained almost the same. 
On the contrary, the 2R  is reduced for every country.  The maximum betas are observed 
at scales 3 for France, UK and Spain; at scale 4 for Greece, Portugal and Netherlands; 
at scale 5 for France, Italy and Germany.  For all countries the 2R  increases as we move 
from lower scales to mid-scales and then it decreases at higher scales except for Greece.  
Overall, values of betas in Eurozone countries, such as France, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, and Portugal, have increased during the period of Eurozone crisis. 
In summary, the values of betas have increased at low frequencies (higher scale) 
across periods and markets.  Values of betas have changed during global financial crisis 
period relatively to the pre-crisis period.  During the period of Eurozone debt crisis, 
values of betas have increased for the majority of the sample Eurozone countries.  The 
increase of multi-scale betas during periods of global financial crisis and Eurozone 
crisis may be induced by a combination of leverage effect and asymmetric response of 
the market to bad news.  In addition, a rich array of literature in behavioral finance 
presented evidence of under/over reaction of stock prices to information in such 
turbulent market condition.  The evidence of asymmetric effect in time-varying beta is 
consistent with the findings of Choudhry and Jayasekera (2012, 2013, 2014) and the 
evidence of leverage effect accords well with the finding of Iqbal and Kume (2014) in 
their study of markets from the UK, France and Germany.  Furthermore, as Braun, 
Nelson and Sunier (1995), and Ball and Kothari (1989) contended that an increase 
(decrease) in market shocks to the firm increase (decrease) the beta and lead to a rise 
(fall) in expected return in market.  Therefore, asymmetry in volatility in these markets 
during the crises periods led to asymmetry in time-varying beta. 
Chiang et. al (2007) and Syllingnakis and Kouretas (2011) provide the evidence of 
financial contagion due to herding behavior during the financial crisis.25  In normal 
market conditions, investors and traders use on some occasions technical analysis such 
as momentum trading to generate above average market return.  However, during the 
crisis, negative information led to a freeze in several markets or may have led to a 
disposition effect.  As mean betas in each scale are around 1 or slightly above 1 and 
increase in higher scales, investors and traders should employ a contrarian trading 
strategy across scales.  The long-term investors may utilize a buy and hold strategy in 
such a bearish market.  Once the market rebound to their long-run mean values, the 
investors may resort to momentum trading strategy. 
Due to space limitations, the results presented in Table 2 to Table 5 are the 
estimated averages for each country.  As a result the values of betas are close to 1 as it 
was expected.  In the Appendix the analytical results are presented for the PSI-20 index 
in order to provide a better understanding of the changes of the betas according to scale.  
More precisely the betas and 2R  for each stock in the PSI-20 index are presented 
together with the raw estimates of betas and 2R .  The results from the remaining 
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 Using the example of US stock market crash of October 1987, Lin et al. (1994) argued that price 
movements driven by fads and herd instinct have the capability of being transmitted across borders when 
speculative trading and noise trading occur in international financial markets. 
countries and indices are available from the authors upon request.  For example, 
Appendix Table 12 indicates that a firm with abbreviated listing BCP (Banco Comercial 
Portugues) shows greatest sensitivity to the market portfolio in Portugal, followed by 
PTC (Portugal Telecom Sgps).  The firms with the abbreviated listing ALT (Altri Sgps) 
and BES (Banco Espirito Santo) demonstrate that long-term traders are most risk 
averse, at scale 5.  Overall, in firms with low betas across scales WUDGHUVDUHµDPDWHXU¶
of risk. 
 
6. Value-at-Risk at different time-scales. 
In this section, we focus on the estimation of the Value-at-Risk (VaR).  VaR is a 
very popular measure that describes the market risk.  VaR measures the amount that an 
investor can lose with a given probability over a certain time horizon. 
We construct a portfolio where individual company stocks within each country 
constitute the portfolio.  For simplicity we assume an equally weighted portfolio of k  
assets where Z  is vector that contains the portfolio weights, i.e. a 1ku  vector which 
each element is 1 k .  Then, the ratio: 
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is an estimate of the contribution of scale j to total VaR of an equally weighted portfolio 
(see for example, Fernandez, 2006; and Masih et al.2010), where 
        2 2 2 2j i j i j m jHV W V W E W V W    (27) 
and  2i jV W  is the variance of stock i at scale j,  i jE W  is the beta of stock i return at 
scale j and the variance of the market portfolio at scale j is given by  2m jV W .  
In Table 6-Table 9 the ( )VaR a  at different time scales for an equally weighted 
portfolio is presented for the four different time periods.  The initial value of the 
SRUWIROLR LVXQLWRI WKHVSHFLILFPDUNHW¶VFXUUHQF\ LQYHVWHG LQ-day horizon at the 
95% confidence interval.  
As we can see from Table 6 to Table 9 the ( )VaR a  declines monotonically as 
we move to higher scales. In other words, the ( )VaR a  is higher at lower scales.  
Similarly, the contribution of the ( )VaR a  is higher at lower scales and decreases as we 
move to higher scales. A potential loss of the portfolio is higher when we focus on 
lower scales. Finally, we can observe that the total ( )VaR a  estimated from the raw data 
and the total ( )VaR a  estimated from the recomposed data are very close.  Our results 
are similar to the ones presented in Fernandez (2006) and Masih et al. (2010) and 
suggest that risk is concentrated at the lower scale of the data.  In all time samples, scale 
1 contributes with more that 42% to the total ( )VaR a  while in some cases reaches up 
to 55%. As Maharaj et. al. (2012) noted, the lower scales capture the activity of 
speculative traders and the higher scales reflect the sentiments of investor with medium 
to long-term investment horizons.  This finding has important implications for scalpers, 
day traders and position traders. 
A closer inspection of Table 6 reveals that the total ( )VaR a  is relatively low for all 
countries.  More precisely, the lower values are observed in Portugal and Italy, 0.009 
and 0.012 respectively.  The higher value is estimated for Greece and it is 0.0164.  
However, these values are not significantly different than the ones observed in France 
and Germany, 0.0146 and 0.0136 respectively. 
In Table 7 the ( )VaR a  is estimated during the crisis time-period.  A closer 
inspection of Table 7 reveals that the ( )VaR a  has grown threefold almost for every 
country.  Again, the lower values are observed for Portugal and Italy, 0.0259 and 
0.0268, respectively while the higher values are observed in France and Netherlands, 
0.0354 and 0.0344, respectively. As Bai et. al. (2003) noted, extreme returns occur 
more frequently in crisis period, information is therefore important for all groups of 
traders, such as hedgers, speculators and arbitragers in both cash and derivative 
markets.  The evidence is also consistent with the findings of Vo (2014). 
In Table 8 the ( )VaR a  estimated in the first post-crisis time period can be found.  
This period is also the same as when the European crisis started.  The effects can be 
found in the estimation of ( )VaR a  in Greece, which was further increased.  On the 
contrary the ( )VaR a  from the remaining countries was decreased or remained stable 
(Italy).  
The results of our analysis between December 1, 2011 and September 10, 2012 are 
presented in Table 9.  During this time Greece was in deep crisis while Spain and Italy 
were under a rescue plan.  This can be reflected from the estimated ( )VaR a  in each 
country.  For Greece the ( )VaR a  is 0.0514 while for Spain and Italy is 0.0278 and 
0.0309.  On the other hand the ( )VaR a  for Germany, UK, Netherlands and France is 
0.0201, 0.017, 0.0226 and 0.0258, respectively.  Surprisingly, the estimated ( )VaR a  
for Portugal, another country with financial problems, is 0.0202. 
Overall, period specific VaR analysis provides a more detailed breakdown of the 
market risk compared to the whole period.  VaR has grown threefold almost for every 
country during the period of global financial crisis.  VaRs in debt-ridden countries are 
larger during Eurozone crisis period relatively to pre-global financial crisis period, with 
the exception of Portugal. 
7. Forecasting the Multiscale Nature of Systematic Risk 
In this section, the analysis of the multiscale nature of the systematic risk will be 
further expanded by employing WNs.  More precisely, WNs will be used in order to 
capture and forecast the dynamics and the multiscale nature of the systematic risk. 
We will use one period of our dataset for in-sample training and one period for out-
of-sample forecasting.  In order to do so, the third data set that represents the post-crisis 
period in US is used to train artificial WNs.  Then the trained WNs will be used in order 
to forecast the betas in the out-of-sample period which is the fourth data set ranging 
from December 1, 2011 to September 10, 2012 and represents the current situation in 
Europe. 
7.1 Wavelet Neural Networks  
WNs are a new class of networks that combine the classic sigmoid neural networks 
and the WA.  WNs have been used with great success in a wide range of applications.  
For a complete theoretical background and a concise treatment of WNs, readers are 
referred to Alexandridis and Zapranis (2014). 
A WN usually has the form of a three layer network.  In the input layer the 
explanatory variables are introduced to the WN.  The hidden layer consists of the hidden 
units (HUs).  In the hidden layer the input variables are transformed to dilated and 
translated version of the mother wavelet.  Finally, in the output layer, the approximation 
of the target values is estimated.  The structure of a single hidden-layer feed forward 
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In that expression, Ȍj(x) is a multidimensional wavelet which is constructed by the 
product of m scalar wavelets, x is the input vector, m is the number of network inputs, 
Ȝ is the number of HUs and w stands for a network weight. 
7.2 Training and Forecasting 
First, the WNs, ( ; )gO x w , had to be trained.  For each stock, wavelet networks were 
trained for each scale for both the detail jD  and smooth components jS .  In order to 
determine the lag series of the training patterns and the network topology, i.e. the 
number of the HUs, the variable selection algorithm described in Alexandridis and  
Zapranis (2014) was followed.  The WNs were trained using the data from the first 
post-crisis period. 
In order to evaluate the performance of the WNs in predicting the dynamics of the 
multiscale betas the 1-period-ahead forecasting method has been employed.  More 
precisely the WNs were trained on the decomposed data of the first post-crisis period 
in order to forecast the values of the beta on the second post-crisis period.  Note, that 
the data from the second post-crisis period have not been used for training or calibration 
of the WNs.  Hence, we produced recursively using a rolling window of 203 out-of-
sample one-period-ahead forecasts. 
In Table 10 the forecasted values of the average betas and 2R  from each market are 
presented for each scale as well as the raw values. The standard deviation, the skewness 
and the kurtosis are also reported. Comparing the forecasted values from Table 10 
against the estimated ones presented in Table 5 we can conclude that the WN has the 
ability to accurately forecast both the betas and the 2R . The multi resolution analysis 
of the systematic risk allowed the WN to be efficiently trained. As a result the WN 
captured the dynamics of the systematic risk and it was able to accurately forecast them. 
Next, comparing the real and forecasted VaR  at different timescales in Table 11 and 
Table 9 we can observe that the WN slightly underestimates the VaR  for all countries.  
However, the basic dynamics of VaR were successfully captured as well as the changes 
of the VaR according to scale. 
Finally, in Figure 4, the 1-period ahead forecast of excess returns of the AEX index 
is presented.  The forecasts were based on the multiscale analysis of the WA.  Then, 
WNs were used to learn the dynamics of the returns in each scale.  The trained networks 
were used to forecast the excess returns.  A closer inspection of Figure 4 reveals that 
the proposed method can accurately track the excess returns.  More analytically, the 
normalized mean square error is 0.148 while the mean and maximum absolute error is 
only 0.002 and 0.034 respectively. 
Due to space limitations we present the results only for the AEX index. The results 
for the reaming countries and stocks are similar and are available upon request from the 
authors. 
8. Conclusions 
The US subprime loan crisis unleashed a series of negative effects on the global 
economy ranging from the stock market collapse, financial institutions failure and 
global recession.  The meltdown of the subprime crisis of 2007 exerted a meteor shower 
HIIHFWDFURVVWKHZRUOG¶VVWRFNPDUNHWE\WKHIRXUWKTXDUWHURI,QWKHODVWTXDUWHU
of 2008, the stock markets of both developed and emerging economies experienced 
large decline in prices of securities.  In this paper, we have investigated the impact of 
the global financial crisis on the systematic and market risks in eight European markets: 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK using the 
framework of a capital asset pricing model.  
In our analysis we first investigated whether the U.S. crisis affected the European 
stock markets by studying the relationship between the U.S market and the eight 
different European countries.  Our results indicate that the correlation between the 
markets increased during the crisis period but significantly decreased when the U.S. 
market started to recover, and correlation increased again when the crisis moved to the 
Eurozone. 
Next, we have studied the multiscale systematic risk locally by applying a national 
CAPM.  Our empirical results indicate that average beta coefficients have a multiscale 
tendency and betas tend to increase at mid to higher scales for the whole period 
supporting the CAPM at medium time horizons. During the sub period of financial 
crisis, the size of betas tends to increase for some countries and R2s increase for every 
country relatively to the pre-crisis period. The increase of multi-scale betas during 
periods of global financial crisis and Eurozone crisis has been induced by a combination 
of leverage effect and asymmetric response of the market to bad news. The evidence of 
leverage effect accords well with the findings of Iqbal and Kume (2014) in their recent 
study of markets from the UK, France and Germany and the evidence of asymmetric 
effect in time-varying beta is consistent with the recent findings of Choudhry and 
Jayasekera (2012, 2013, 2014). Moreover, in our analysis, the results from the two post-
crisis samples, indicate that changes of both betas and 2R varies between the two groups 
of the European markets.  
The scale dependent VaR results suggest that risk is concentrated at the lower scale 
of the data. VaR estimates tend to increase threefold almost for every country during 
the global financial crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period.  Therefore, a potential 
loss of portfolio is higher at lower scales; furthermore, a potential loss of portfolio 
across scales is far higher during the crisis period.  The evidence of multiscale nature 
of systematic risk and market risk has important policy implication for financial 
practitioners, fund managers, researchers and policy-makers. 
Finally, WNs were employed in order to capture the dynamics of the multiscale 
systematic risk.  Our results indicate that WNs can accurately forecast both the betas 
and the VaRs. 
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 Figure 1: Selected counterparty exposures to AIG at the time of its failure. 
 
Sources: American International Group (d) and Capital IQ. 
(a) The chart shows collateral that AIG returned between 16 September and 31 December 2008 to retire CDS 
obligations which existed at the time of its failure. 
(b) Selected counterparties shown. Does not represent total exposure to AIG. 








Figure 3. A Feed forward Wavelet Network. 
 
 
Figure 4. The real and forecast of excess returns of the AEX index 
  
Table 1. Correlation between the S&P 500 and the European stock markets in different time-periods. 
 
 






0.96 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 
In 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.95 
First Post 0.50 -0.50 0.32 0.83 0.87 -0.14 -0.06 -0.11 
Second Post 0.61 0.11 0.66 0.92 0.62 -0.26 0.16 -0.11 
Whole 0.81 0.45 0.71 0.83 0.95 0.55 0.57 0.57 
 
  
Table 2. Beta and R2 computed from recomposed crystals of each index. Pre crisis period 
 Beta at each scale R2 at each scale Raw Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Beta R2 
AEX              
Mean 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.29 0.28 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.95 0.31 
SD 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.34 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.15 
Skew. 0.23 0.25 0.31 1.07 0.26 1.61 1.49 1.32 0.45 0.42 0.15 1.66 
Kurtosis 2.71 1.80 2.15 3.48 3.57 4.42 4.41 4.30 2.86 3.07 2.32 4.87 
ATHEX  
            
Mean 0.89 0.82 0.92 0.98 0.92 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.89 0.30 
SD 0.32 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.46 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.26 0.17 
Skew. 
-0.25 0.40 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.75 0.91 0.57 0.62 0.44 -0.01 0.79 
Kurtosis 2.51 3.75 2.31 1.96 1.94 3.44 3.48 3.06 3.01 2.45 2.48 3.44 
CAC 40 
            
Mean 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.06 1.04 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.42 0.37 1.01 0.40 
SD 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.14 
Skew. 0.28 -0.17 -0.18 1.12 0.34 0.67 0.35 0.45 0.33 -0.09 0.17 0.67 
Kurtosis 2.70 2.75 2.64 4.97 4.24 2.71 2.59 2.44 2.02 2.26 2.74 2.68 
DAX 30 
            
Mean 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.31 0.33 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.88 0.35 
SD 0.18 0.17 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.12 
Skew. 0.23 -0.06 0.04 0.41 0.84 0.82 0.96 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.85 
Kurtosis 2.32 2.10 2.30 2.61 4.34 3.73 4.19 2.43 2.26 2.07 2.10 3.61 
FTSE 100 
            
Mean 1.03 1.03 1.11 1.11 0.97 0.31 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.33 1.05 0.32 
SD 0.38 0.35 0.45 0.41 0.46 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.35 0.11 
Skew. 1.26 1.15 1.05 0.46 0.89 0.29 0.26 0.11 -0.03 0.26 1.14 0.13 
Kurtosis 4.65 4.15 4.13 2.76 3.51 2.38 2.41 2.11 2.41 2.32 4.17 2.13 
IBEX 35 
            
Mean 1.02 1.04 1.08 1.18 1.13 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.48 0.50 1.05 0.42 
SD 0.23 0.24 0.34 0.43 0.38 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.15 
Skew. 0.41 0.46 0.46 1.15 0.85 0.63 0.52 -0.11 -0.15 -0.16 0.66 0.58 
Kurtosis 2.25 2.68 3.26 3.64 3.02 2.77 3.02 2.61 2.74 2.49 2.79 2.81 
MIB 
            
Mean 0.89 0.92 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.93 0.32 
SD 0.31 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.28 0.13 
Skew. 
-0.22 -0.59 0.20 0.71 0.00 0.28 0.26 0.47 0.19 -0.20 -0.29 0.28 
Kurtosis 2.92 2.85 2.37 4.01 2.54 2.73 2.60 2.93 2.00 2.35 2.57 2.81 
PSI-20 
            
Mean 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.97 0.96 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.27 0.23 0.81 0.16 
SD 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.39 0.54 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.35 0.12 
Skew. 
-0.12 0.03 -0.38 0.80 0.24 1.15 1.17 1.05 -0.10 0.18 -0.44 0.93 




Table 3.  Beta and R2 computed from recomposed crystals of each index. In crisis period 
 Beta at each scale R2 at each scale Raw Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Beta R2 
AEX             
Mean 0.93 0.95 1.05 1.09 1.01 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.50 0.97 0.47 
SD 0.37 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.41 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.38 0.12 
Skew. 1.21 1.01 0.51 0.40 0.74 0.43 -0.18 -0.62 -0.47 -0.19 0.98 0.05 
Kurtosis 3.76 3.63 2.72 2.23 2.54 2.74 2.68 2.66 2.07 1.86 3.35 2.79 
ATHEX  
            
Mean 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.92 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.47 0.46 0.85 0.45 
SD 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.19 
Skew. 0.20 0.25 -0.31 0.55 -0.14 0.41 0.31 0.11 0.23 0.09 0.20 0.36 
Kurtosis 2.09 2.59 2.75 3.17 1.54 1.94 2.24 2.47 2.71 2.33 2.23 2.15 
CAC 40 
            
Mean 1.00 1.05 1.13 1.14 1.12 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.49 0.47 1.04 0.53 
SD 0.28 0.31 0.42 0.45 0.35 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.11 
Skew. 0.47 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.30 -0.01 -0.63 -0.67 -0.92 0.20 0.20 
Kurtosis 2.64 2.40 2.26 2.37 3.37 2.56 2.38 2.86 2.71 4.99 2.38 2.57 
DAX 30 
            
Mean 0.84 0.87 1.03 0.93 0.94 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.89 0.39 
SD 0.28 0.30 0.39 0.42 0.39 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.29 0.14 
Skew. 0.03 -0.03 -0.13 0.08 0.20 -0.27 0.00 -0.12 -0.32 -0.48 0.00 -0.20 
Kurtosis 2.16 2.10 2.45 2.57 2.65 2.04 2.05 2.62 2.47 2.59 2.17 2.09 
FTSE 100 
            
Mean 0.97 0.99 1.05 1.08 0.99 0.39 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.38 1.00 0.41 
SD 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.63 0.46 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.38 0.11 
Skew. 1.12 1.12 0.77 1.63 1.21 0.22 0.11 -0.12 -0.03 0.13 1.09 0.21 
Kurtosis 3.42 3.64 2.96 6.97 4.00 3.10 2.60 2.73 2.60 2.50 3.45 3.10 
IBEX 35 
            
Mean 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.95 1.02 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.39 0.96 0.53 
SD 0.25 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.16 
Skew. 0.21 0.06 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.12 0.28 
Kurtosis 2.60 2.39 2.40 2.45 2.48 2.58 2.28 2.39 2.98 2.45 2.37 2.61 
MIB 
            
Mean 0.77 0.76 0.83 0.89 0.92 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.80 0.41 
SD 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.17 
Skew. 0.37 0.27 0.16 0.03 0.65 0.33 0.18 -0.29 -0.11 -0.01 0.20 0.05 
Kurtosis 3.32 3.11 2.94 3.00 4.09 2.58 2.76 2.51 2.37 2.31 3.27 2.75 
PSI-20 
            
Mean 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.96 1.03 0.40 0.38 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.96 0.43 
SD 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.10 
Skew. 
-0.36 -0.63 -0.32 -0.51 0.62 -0.38 0.45 -0.08 -0.91 0.33 -0.42 0.16 




Table 4. Beta and R2 computed from recomposed crystals of each index. First post crisis period 
 Beta at each scale R2 at each scale Raw Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Beta R2 
AEX             
Mean 1.02 1.04 1.12 1.09 1.13 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.52 0.60 1.05 0.51 
SD 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.42 0.14 
Skew. 0.79 0.92 0.16 0.16 -0.11 -0.06 -0.33 -0.76 -0.49 -0.67 0.60 -0.34 
Kurtosis 3.50 3.90 2.46 2.44 2.15 2.19 2.23 2.28 2.08 3.04 3.15 2.21 
ATHEX 
            
Mean 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.94 0.89 0.46 0.51 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.87 0.48 
SD 0.43 0.45 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.42 0.19 
Skew. 0.58 0.65 0.24 0.19 0.39 0.32 0.14 0.13 -0.13 0.05 0.56 0.23 
Kurtosis 2.07 2.11 1.64 1.83 2.08 2.17 1.90 1.83 2.03 1.88 2.02 2.04 
CAC 40 
            
Mean 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.04 1.06 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.58 0.61 1.04 0.61 
SD 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.32 0.13 
Skew. 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.43 0.27 -0.44 -0.32 -0.75 -0.40 -0.51 0.52 -0.45 
Kurtosis 3.13 3.26 2.94 3.18 2.43 2.65 2.52 3.38 2.29 2.58 3.06 2.79 
DAX 30 
            
Mean 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.45 0.55 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.92 0.51 
SD 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.28 0.15 
Skew. 
-0.31 -0.18 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.76 -0.69 -0.62 -0.22 0.07 -0.27 -0.67 
Kurtosis 2.29 2.65 2.12 2.21 1.90 2.88 3.11 2.26 2.37 1.93 2.23 2.76 
FTSE 100 
            
Mean 1.00 1.04 1.07 1.03 1.03 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.44 0.49 1.03 0.44 
SD 0.43 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.42 0.15 
Skew. 0.87 0.65 0.75 0.58 0.88 0.35 -0.17 -0.24 -0.05 -0.26 0.75 0.09 
Kurtosis 3.14 2.67 2.79 2.74 3.64 2.48 2.38 2.18 2.31 2.20 2.84 2.31 
IBEX 35 
            
Mean 0.86 0.89 0.96 0.94 1.01 0.53 0.62 0.64 0.57 0.60 0.89 0.57 
SD 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.17 
Skew. 0.43 0.35 0.28 0.15 0.31 0.69 -0.05 0.14 0.04 -0.27 0.33 0.45 
Kurtosis 2.73 2.83 1.96 2.30 2.88 2.75 3.35 2.72 2.06 2.26 2.55 2.86 
MIB 
            
Mean 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.51 0.56 0.58 0.52 0.49 0.89 0.53 
SD 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.30 0.17 
Skew. 0.33 0.32 0.19 0.10 0.36 -0.21 -0.27 -0.37 -0.08 -0.39 0.30 -0.20 
Kurtosis 3.02 3.07 2.73 2.56 2.71 2.50 2.18 2.05 2.10 2.05 2.98 2.35 
PSI-20 
            
Mean 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.94 1.01 0.44 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.94 0.47 
SD 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.31 0.14 
Skew. 
-0.91 -0.59 -1.27 -0.93 0.36 -1.36 -1.77 -1.97 -1.40 -0.74 -0.93 -1.90 




Table 5. Beta and R2 computed from recomposed crystals of each index. Second post crisis period 
 Beta at each scale R2 at each scale Raw Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Beta R2 
AEX             
Mean 1.23 1.21 1.24 1.26 1.20 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.36 0.26 1.22 0.42 
SD 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.79 0.93 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.57 0.18 
Skew. 0.21 0.39 0.58 1.14 0.06 -0.45 -0.36 -0.22 0.24 0.59 0.31 -0.46 
Kurtosis 1.79 1.98 2.15 3.68 2.06 2.83 2.47 2.37 2.03 2.42 1.89 2.68 
ATHEX  
            
Mean 0.96 1.01 1.05 1.17 1.09 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.69 1.01 0.43 
SD 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.76 0.44 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.56 0.17 
Skew. 1.03 0.80 0.36 0.64 0.06 0.44 0.46 -0.22 -0.29 -1.37 0.89 0.45 
Kurtosis 2.74 2.53 2.16 2.68 2.90 2.21 2.16 2.42 1.93 5.26 2.68 2.17 
CAC 40 
            
Mean 1.10 1.14 1.16 1.11 1.16 0.53 0.57 0.56 0.47 0.38 1.12 0.54 
SD 0.37 0.39 0.47 0.58 0.67 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.39 0.15 
Skew. 0.29 0.38 0.58 1.13 0.31 -0.21 -0.84 -0.70 -0.20 -0.33 0.44 -0.37 
Kurtosis 2.17 2.38 2.84 4.55 2.47 2.00 3.54 2.92 1.92 1.99 2.54 2.20 
DAX 30 
            
Mean 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.94 1.02 0.42 0.53 0.54 0.41 0.37 0.92 0.47 
SD 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.48 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.33 0.16 
Skew. 0.50 0.34 -0.18 0.20 0.52 -0.09 -0.08 -0.47 0.23 -0.34 0.17 -0.17 
Kurtosis 3.36 2.49 2.29 2.18 2.44 2.22 2.48 2.42 1.99 2.25 2.66 2.29 
FTSE 100 
            
Mean 1.07 1.17 1.18 1.10 1.00 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.30 1.10 0.40 
SD 0.47 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.49 0.15 
Skew. 0.68 0.44 0.37 0.75 0.75 -0.17 -0.13 -0.25 0.13 0.25 0.55 -0.10 
Kurtosis 3.08 2.41 2.52 2.88 3.26 2.20 2.23 2.23 2.05 1.99 2.65 2.17 
IBEX 35 
            
Mean 0.90 0.87 0.95 0.86 0.91 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.42 0.48 0.90 0.49 
SD 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.42 0.56 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.31 0.20 
Skew. 
-0.25 0.21 0.61 0.20 0.98 0.07 0.18 -0.09 0.31 -0.14 -0.05 0.14 
Kurtosis 2.26 1.75 3.91 1.89 4.48 2.94 2.79 2.74 2.24 1.96 2.13 2.94 
MIB 
            
Mean 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.92 1.01 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.46 0.42 0.98 0.50 
SD 0.38 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.64 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.41 0.16 
Skew. 0.63 0.55 0.60 0.58 0.43 -0.09 -0.16 -0.45 -0.33 -0.12 0.62 -0.03 
Kurtosis 2.47 2.19 2.68 4.03 2.30 2.36 2.28 2.47 2.45 1.59 2.39 2.30 
PSI-20 
            
Mean 0.97 0.93 0.97 1.10 1.04 0.26 0.31 0.34 0.42 0.46 0.97 0.30 
SD 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.73 0.69 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.28 0.51 0.15 
Skew. 0.18 0.20 0.62 0.99 0.21 0.21 -0.20 -0.34 -0.44 -0.13 0.36 -0.16 
Kurtosis 2.10 2.23 3.45 3.50 1.86 2.05 1.96 2.19 2.75 1.75 2.59 2.07 
 
 
Table 6. Value At Risk (VaR) at different time scales for equally weighted portfolio. Pre crisis period. 
 VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR 
 AEX  ATHEX  CAC  DAX  
Scale1 0.0091 50.14% 0.0112 46.49% 0.0106 53.33% 0.0095 48.50% 
Scale2 0.0062 22.84% 0.0081 24.14% 0.0070 23.05% 0.0066 23.73% 
Scale3 0.0051 15.54% 0.0068 17.37% 0.0053 13.38% 0.0054 15.94% 
Scale4 0.0037 8.24% 0.0049 9.03% 0.0040 7.37% 0.0040 8.55% 
Scale5 0.0023 3.24% 0.0028 2.96% 0.0025 2.87% 0.0025 3.29% 
Total 0.0129  0.0164  0.0146  0.0136  
Total Raw 0.0135  0.0171  0.0152  0.0142  
 FTSE  IBEX  MIB  PSI  
Scale1 0.0093 52.02% 0.0101 49.61% 0.0090 54.48% 0.0060 43.56% 
Scale2 0.0061 22.28% 0.0070 23.85% 0.0057 21.72% 0.0045 24.42% 
Scale3 0.0049 14.79% 0.0052 13.30% 0.0044 13.07% 0.0036 15.43% 
Scale4 0.0036 7.98% 0.0043 8.86% 0.0033 7.19% 0.0031 12.00% 
Scale5 0.0022 2.93% 0.0030 4.38% 0.0023 3.53% 0.0019 4.60% 
Total 0.0128  0.0143  0.0121  0.0091  
Total Raw 0.0135  0.0149  0.0129  0.0099  
 
Table 7. Value At Risk (VaR) at different time scales for equally weighted portfolio. In crisis period. 
 VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR 
 AEX   ATHEX  CAC   DAX   
Scale1 0.0246 51.00% 0.0227 49.31% 0.0255 51.82% 0.0204 49.04% 
Scale2 0.0180 27.46% 0.0166 26.24% 0.0189 28.44% 0.0152 27.32% 
Scale3 0.0125 13.12% 0.0116 12.89% 0.0120 11.54% 0.0109 14.01% 
Scale4 0.0081 5.58% 0.0093 8.27% 0.0087 6.06% 0.0075 6.59% 
Scale5 0.0058 2.85% 0.0059 3.29% 0.0052 2.14% 0.0051 3.05% 
Total 0.0344  0.0324  0.0354  0.0292  
Total Raw 0.0364  0.0348  0.0371  0.0312  
 FTSE  IBEX  MIB  PSI  
Scale1 0.0226 52.26% 0.0232 54.64% 0.0188 49.33% 0.0179 47.75% 
Scale2 0.0168 28.85% 0.0159 25.61% 0.0138 26.56% 0.0132 25.87% 
Scale3 0.0105 11.25% 0.0112 12.67% 0.0099 13.75% 0.0104 15.98% 
Scale4 0.0073 5.53% 0.0072 5.29% 0.0070 6.75% 0.0068 6.95% 
Scale5 0.0045 2.11% 0.0042 1.79% 0.0051 3.60% 0.0048 3.45% 
Total 0.0312  0.0314  0.0268  0.0259  






Table 8. Value At Risk (VaR) at different time scales for equally weighted portfolio. First post crisis period. 
 VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR 
 AEX   ATHEX  CAC   DAX   
Scale1 0.0157 44.45% 0.0274 49.51% 0.0186 46.58% 0.0150 44.47% 
Scale2 0.0126 28.40% 0.0215 30.47% 0.0149 29.91% 0.0124 30.39% 
Scale3 0.0097 16.78% 0.0138 12.56% 0.0106 15.10% 0.0092 16.63% 
Scale4 0.0060 6.44% 0.0087 5.03% 0.0064 5.48% 0.0053 5.56% 
Scale5 0.0047 3.93% 0.0061 2.42% 0.0047 2.93% 0.0039 2.95% 
Total 0.0236  0.0390  0.0273  0.0225  
Total Raw 0.0240  0.0396  0.0277  0.0230  
 FTSE  IBEX  MIB  PSI  
Scale1 0.0136 45.08% 0.0168 42.66% 0.0182 47.56% 0.0150 45.77% 
Scale2 0.0111 29.87% 0.0145 31.67% 0.0143 29.41% 0.0124 31.11% 
Scale3 0.0081 15.98% 0.0106 16.76% 0.0102 14.83% 0.0082 13.62% 
Scale4 0.0049 5.77% 0.0063 5.95% 0.0062 5.59% 0.0054 5.92% 
Scale5 0.0037 3.30% 0.0044 2.96% 0.0043 2.61% 0.0042 3.59% 
Total 0.0203  0.0258  0.0264  0.0222  
Total Raw 0.0206  0.0262  0.0269  0.0227  
 
Table 9. Value at Risk (VaR) at different time scales for equally weighted portfolio.Second post crisis period. 
 VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR 
 AEX   ATHEX  CAC   DAX   
Scale1 0.0166 54.04% 0.0348 45.80% 0.0183 50.50% 0.0135 45.01% 
Scale2 0.0115 25.85% 0.0265 26.61% 0.0139 29.03% 0.0113 31.52% 
Scale3 0.0086 14.57% 0.0182 12.49% 0.0099 14.75% 0.0084 17.32% 
Scale4 0.0048 4.49% 0.0147 8.19% 0.0053 4.27% 0.0042 4.30% 
Scale5 0.0023 1.05% 0.0135 6.91% 0.0031 1.44% 0.0027 1.85% 
Total 0.0226  0.0514  0.0258  0.0201  
Total Raw 0.0230  0.0525  0.0262  0.0205  
 FTSE  IBEX  MIB  PSI  
Scale1 0.0126 54.74% 0.0190 46.65% 0.0218 49.69% 0.0130 41.25% 
Scale2 0.0087 26.24% 0.0151 29.26% 0.0165 28.45% 0.0106 27.34% 
Scale3 0.0059 12.16% 0.0113 16.56% 0.0121 15.45% 0.0080 15.83% 
Scale4 0.0038 5.10% 0.0060 4.68% 0.0064 4.27% 0.0065 10.49% 
Scale5 0.0023 1.76% 0.0047 2.85% 0.0045 2.15% 0.0046 5.08% 
Total 0.0170  0.0278  0.0309  0.0202  




 Table 10. Forecast of Beta and R2for the second post crisis period. 
 Beta at each scale R2 at each scale Raw Data 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Beta R2 
AEX             
Mean 1.23 1.19 1.18 1.17 1.23 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.37 0.33 1.20 0.43 
SD 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.63 0.70 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.53 0.16 
Skew. 0.18 0.39 0.57 1.01 0.08 -0.26 -0.33 -0.25 0.22 0.31 0.30 -0.39 
Kurtosis 1.84 2.03 2.19 3.90 1.73 2.73 2.32 2.59 2.21 1.84 2.02 2.66 
ATHEX             
Mean 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.16 1.09 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.69 1.03 0.46 
SD 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.78 0.45 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.57 0.17 
Skew. 0.88 0.85 0.46 0.72 0.07 0.30 0.43 -0.20 -0.32 -1.31 0.80 0.32 
Kurtosis 2.45 2.49 2.15 2.64 2.74 2.13 2.18 2.18 1.92 4.97 2.44 2.11 
CAC 40             
Mean 1.17 1.15 1.16 1.11 1.15 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.46 0.43 1.15 0.54 
SD 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.55 0.55 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.39 0.15 
Skew. 0.04 0.18 0.46 1.17 0.11 -0.32 -0.80 -0.68 -0.16 -0.18 0.20 -0.45 
Kurtosis 2.06 2.11 2.61 4.80 2.01 2.04 3.26 2.99 1.78 2.19 2.31 2.14 
DAX 30             
Mean 0.94 0.99 0.95 0.95 1.03 0.43 0.54 0.55 0.42 0.46 0.97 0.49 
SD 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.31 0.15 
Skew. 0.37 0.36 -0.19 0.40 0.66 -0.08 -0.23 -0.46 0.25 -0.56 0.08 -0.21 
Kurtosis 2.66 2.40 2.32 2.29 3.05 2.16 2.44 2.34 1.84 2.13 2.43 2.26 
FTSE 100             
Mean 1.02 1.09 1.09 1.02 0.95 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.35 1.04 0.39 
SD 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.45 0.15 
Skew. 0.75 0.53 0.43 0.78 0.83 -0.09 -0.04 -0.20 0.22 0.21 0.60 -0.01 
Kurtosis 3.14 2.42 2.44 2.86 4.05 2.14 2.15 2.10 2.20 1.96 2.57 2.13 
IBEX 35             
Mean 1.00 0.96 1.03 0.89 0.96 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.43 0.56 0.99 0.56 
SD 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.41 0.43 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.16 
Skew. 0.16 -0.03 0.85 -0.09 0.18 0.88 0.60 0.34 0.24 -0.32 0.04 0.81 
Kurtosis 2.45 1.60 4.53 1.71 1.69 2.93 2.54 2.36 2.04 2.24 2.09 2.66 
MIB             
Mean 1.07 1.05 1.07 0.98 1.11 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.47 0.47 1.06 0.52 
SD 0.42 0.45 0.51 0.44 0.57 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.45 0.15 
Skew. 0.57 0.35 0.36 0.68 0.26 0.18 -0.02 -0.30 -0.29 -0.32 0.40 0.08 
Kurtosis 2.27 1.89 2.33 3.84 2.08 2.14 2.03 2.73 2.06 1.68 1.98 2.18 
PSI-20             
Mean 0.93 0.90 0.94 1.16 1.06 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.41 0.45 0.97 0.29 
SD 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.76 0.70 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.51 0.14 
Skew. 0.02 0.31 0.94 0.77 0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.53 -0.72 -0.04 0.40 -0.15 
Kurtosis 1.93 2.17 4.05 2.98 1.68 1.78 2.07 2.45 3.00 1.65 2.46 2.19 
 
Table 11. Forecast of Value At Risk (VaR) at different time scales for equally weighted portfolio. Second post crisis period. 
 VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR VaR 
Contribution 
to VaR 
 AEX   ATHEX  CAC   DAX   
Scale1 0.0120 46.59% 0.0265 39.86% 0.0138 43.90% 0.0102 38.22% 
Scale2 0.0093 27.79% 0.0208 24.67% 0.0114 30.12% 0.0094 32.22% 
Scale3 0.0073 17.20% 0.0157 14.02% 0.0087 17.47% 0.0074 19.82% 
Scale4 0.0043 6.04% 0.0139 11.05% 0.0050 5.68% 0.0040 5.96% 
Scale5 0.0027 2.38% 0.0135 10.39% 0.0035 2.83% 0.0032 3.77% 
Total 0.0176  0.0419  0.0208  0.0165  
Total Raw 0.0181  0.0433  0.0213  0.0171  
 FTSE  IBEX  MIB  PSI  
Scale1 0.0086 46.52% 0.0152 39.20% 0.0164 41.15% 0.0093 31.91% 
Scale2 0.0068 28.89% 0.0136 31.36% 0.0141 30.19% 0.0085 26.47% 
Scale3 0.0048 14.59% 0.0107 19.43% 0.0111 18.71% 0.0069 17.52% 
Scale4 0.0033 6.60% 0.0058 5.76% 0.0063 6.06% 0.0066 16.05% 
Scale5 0.0023 3.40% 0.0050 4.25% 0.0051 3.89% 0.0047 8.05% 
Total 0.0127  0.0243  0.0256  0.0165  





Table 12.  Beta and R2 computed from recomposed crystals of each stock in Portugal index PSI 20. Pre crisis period. 
 Beta at each scale R2 at each scale Raw Data 
Symbol 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Beta R2 
P:ALT 1.02 1.47 0.82 0.54 0.27 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 1.03 0.08 
P:BPI 0.72 0.73 0.99 0.80 0.81 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.85 0.13 
P:BCP 1.46 1.36 1.49 1.23 1.49 0.36 0.33 0.49 0.44 0.54 1.35 0.38 
P:BES 0.42 0.39 0.61 0.63 0.26 0.12 0.08 0.24 0.33 0.03 0.51 0.18 
P:ECP 1.10 0.99 1.04 1.04 1.05 0.34 0.28 0.42 0.46 0.37 1.07 0.38 
LX:ESP 
-0.13 -0.18 -0.06 0.63 0.37 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.00 
P:JMT 0.63 0.32 0.54 0.57 0.36 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.56 0.09 
P:EGL 0.61 0.48 0.67 1.44 0.99 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.32 0.17 0.76 0.10 
P:PTI 0.39 0.30 0.69 0.69 1.40 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.34 0.56 0.07 
P:PTC 1.24 1.42 0.92 1.08 0.90 0.32 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.30 1.18 0.36 
P:SEM 0.45 0.30 0.61 0.74 1.64 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.14 0.38 0.59 0.08 
P:SNCA 0.99 1.26 0.77 1.79 1.96 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.30 0.32 1.15 0.12 
P:SOI 0.62 0.67 1.14 0.85 0.66 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.79 0.09 
P:SON 1.05 1.01 1.24 1.59 1.46 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.44 0.42 1.15 0.22 
P:PTM 0.35 0.54 0.65 0.96 0.84 0.05 0.09 0.18 0.41 0.20 0.56 0.13 
Mean 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.97 0.96 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.27 0.23 0.81 0.16 
SD 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.39 0.54 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.35 0.12 
Skew. 
-0.12 0.03 -0.38 0.80 0.24 1.15 1.17 1.05 -0.10 0.18 -0.44 0.12 
Kurtosis 2.57 2.01 3.80 2.49 1.99 2.81 3.02 3.20 1.63 1.89 2.77 0.12 
 
